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Abstract
We assess the fiscal behaviour in the European Union countries for the period 1990-
2005 via the responsiveness of budget balances to several determinants. The results 
show that the existence of effective fiscal rules, the degree of public spending 
decentralization, and the electoral cycle can impinge on the country’s fiscal position. 
Furthermore, the results also support the responsiveness of primary balances to 
government indebtedness. 
Keywords: fiscal regimes, fiscal rules, fiscal decentralization, European Union, panel 
Data
JEL Classification: C23, E62, H62 
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Non-technical summary 
In this paper we employ panel data analysis to assess the determinants of government’s 
fiscal behaviour for the 27 EU countries for the period between 1990 and 2005. We 
contribute to the literature by using, in the empirical analysis of government’s fiscal 
behaviour, both a set of fiscal rules and a government decentralisation measure among 
the determinants of fiscal discipline. For instance, we assess whether a higher degree of 
government spending decentralization is detrimental for a country’s fiscal position, a 
hypothesis that is corroborated by our empirical analysis. 
Considering that cross-country dependence can mirror common changes in the 
behaviour of fiscal authorities (EU membership, run-up to EMU, SGP, peer pressure, 
capital markets views), that in recent years there is increased economic synchronization 
in the EU and that common policy shocks can affect fiscal positions in all EU countries, 
the use of a panel data approach seems therefore adequate. Moreover, the panel 
framework allows us to use the information contained in the cross-section dimension 
and increases the performance and accuracy of the estimated specifications. In addition, 
cross-country heterogeneity can also be captured by interaction terms, while variables 
may differ regarding their variances either on the cross-section or on the time series 
dimensions.  
According to our results, the EU 27 governments increase the primary balance surplus 
as a result of increases in the outstanding stock of government debt. Both EMU and 
SGP arrangements have a statistically significant positive effect on the improvement of 
the fiscal position, which may imply an increased effort pursued by the EU countries to 
comply with the existing EU fiscal framework. On the other hand, we do not observe a 
statistically significant effect on primary spending. It is also possible to conclude that 
when the debt-to-GDP ratio is below the debt threshold of 80 percent a stronger overall 
fiscal rule contributes to improve the primary budget balance. Moreover, parliamentary 
elections negatively impinge on the improvement of the primary balance. 
Regarding public spending decentralization, increasing the ratio of state plus local 
spending over central government spending contributes to an increase in the total 
primary spending-to-GDP ratio in the subsequent period, and when the debt ratio is 
above the 80 percent threshold we observe a more negative effect of the decentralisation 
proxy on primary balances. For instance, an increase of 1 percentage point of GDP in 
the decentralisation variable worsens the primary balance by 0.1 percentage points of 
GDP. Moreover, for a higher level of government indebtedness, the positive effect of 
spending decentralisation on primary spending is also higher. 
All in all, we can say that the existence of fiscal rules, a lower degree of public spending 
decentralization positively contribute to a higher responsiveness of primary surpluses to 
government indebtedness (a more Ricardian behaviour of the fiscal authorities in the 
EU), while the electoral cycle also has the expected effect. In terms of future work, one 
can think, for instance, of assessing other measures of fiscal decentralization or 
alternative data regarding the proxy for fiscal rules.
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1. Introduction 
In the context of the European Union (EU), Member States face a fiscal 
framework that asks for the implementation of sound fiscal policies, notably within the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) guidelines put forward in 1997. Such fiscal framework 
is an indispensable tool for the well functioning of the European and Monetary Union 
(EMU), which has been gradually put in place since 1992. However, the Member 
States’ track records of complying with the fiscal rules laid down in the SGP have been 
mixed. Therefore, it is relevant to assess what sort of determinants play a role in 
contributing to the improvement of fiscal discipline in EU countries. Certainly, the 
degree of national implementation and ownership of the European fiscal framework, i.e. 
the existence of supportive and effective fiscal rules at the Member State level, seems to 
be of high relevance in this context.  
A recent study by the European Commission1 points to significant heterogeneity 
of national fiscal frameworks within the European Union and suggests that ‘stronger’ 
fiscal rules indeed are conducive to sound public finances. Moreover, the study argues 
that there seems to be a recent trend to stronger integration of sub-national levels of 
government into the national rules framework, an aspect of particular importance in 
countries like Germany or Spain which are characterised by a pronounced fiscal 
federalism.2 In the absence of fiscal policy coordination at the mentioned level, a high 
level of budget decentralisation, for example, might well interfere with the ability to 
comply with national or European fiscal targets respectively. Further well-known 
determinants of governments’ fiscal behaviour are the level of government 
indebtedness, i.e. whether increases of primary surpluses occur as a response to higher 
government debt ratios, as well as the relevance of electoral budget cycles. 
                                                          
1 See European Commission (2006). 
2 Dában et al. (2003) review the experience of fiscal rules in several OECD countries.
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Therefore, in this paper we employ panel data analysis to assess the 
determinants of government’s fiscal behaviour for the 27 EU countries for the period 
between 1990 and 2005. We contribute to the literature by using, in the empirical 
analysis of government’s fiscal behaviour, both a set of fiscal rules and a government 
decentralisation measure among the determinants of fiscal discipline. For instance, we 
assess whether a higher degree of government spending decentralization is detrimental 
for a country’s fiscal position, a hypothesis that is corroborated by our empirical 
analysis. 
Considering that cross-country dependence can mirror common changes in the 
behaviour of fiscal authorities (EU membership, run-up to EMU, SGP, peer pressure, 
capital markets views), that in recent years there is increased economic synchronization 
in the EU and that common policy shocks can affect fiscal positions in all EU countries, 
the use of a panel data approach seems therefore adequate. Moreover, the panel 
framework allows us to use the information contained in the cross-section dimension 
and increases the performance and accuracy of the estimated specifications. In addition, 
cross-country heterogeneity can also be captured by interaction terms, while variables 
may differ regarding their variances either on the cross-section or on the time series 
dimensions. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section Two provides motivation and 
describes the empirical strategy. Section Three presents and discusses our results. 
Section Four summarises the paper’s main findings. 
2. Motivation and empirical strategy 
When thinking about the determinants of fiscal behaviour it seems pertinent to 
expect governments to attain primary surpluses if for instance, they want to downsize 
8
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the existing stock of general government debt. The underlying idea being that if fiscal 
authorities are driven by debt stabilization and sustainability motives, a positive 
response of budget balances to the stock of outstanding government debt should be 
expected. Therefore, a fiscal policy reaction function where a measure of the primary 
balance reacts to the debt variable is a possible avenue for such analysis: 
1 1 1it i it it it it it its s b z f x t u . (1) 
In (1) the index i (i=1,…,N) denotes the country, the index t (t=1,…,T) indicates 
the period and i stands for the individual effects to be estimated for each country i. sit is 
the primary balance as a percentage of GDP for country i in period t, sit-1 is the 
observation on the same series for the same country i in the previous period, and bit-1 is 
the debt-to-GDP ratio in period t-1 for country i. z is the output gap, computed as the 
difference between actual GDP and potential GDP as a percentage of potential GDP 
and, f is a fiscal rule indicator, and x is a vector of additional institutional, political, and 
other control variables such as the degree of public spending decentralization, and 
specific dummy variables to signal EU enlargement, the run-up phase to EMU and SGP 
sub-periods. Additionally, it is assumed that the disturbances uit are independent across 
countries and time fixed effects are also included. 
The use of primary rather than total balances is justified by the fact that the 
intertemporal government budget constraint relates to the primary surplus. Moreover, 
the use of the primary balance is logical since primary expenditure is more easily under 
the discretionary control of the government. Under such a fiscal reaction function, one 
assumes that the primary balance of period t is dependent on last year’s primary 
balance. Hence, making the primary balance a function of government debt, allows 
testing, for instance, if  > 0, in other words, if the government tries to increase the 
primary balance in order to react to the existing stock of public debt and comply with 
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the government budget constraint, which could be seen as a sign that primary surpluses 
positively reacting to government indebtedness.3 In other words, in such a regime, 
primary budget balances are expected to react to government debt, in order to ensure 
fiscal solvency. 
The use of a panel framework, apart from allowing the use of the information 
contained in the cross-section dimension, also increases the performance and accuracy 
of the estimated specifications. In addition, one should point out that although the 
variance of the decentralisation measure is more cross-sectional, the variance of 
government indebtedness is both cross-sectional and time series related. 
There are some econometric issues that come up when estimating equation (1). 
Since our panel has a relatively small time dimension (16 years) with respect to the 
number of units in the panel (27countries), it then important to check for the absence of 
a bias related to the dynamic specification. In particular, if the Least Square Dummy 
Variable estimator (LSDV) is used to estimate a dynamic model, results may suffer 
from the well-known “Nickell-Bias” (see Nickell, 1981). While a number of consistent 
Instrumental Variables (IV) and General Method of Moments (GMM) estimators4 have 
been proposed to deal with this issue in micro panels characterised by a large number of 
cross-sectional units, Monte Carlo evidence points to the superiority of bias corrected 
LSDV estimators (LSDVC) in relatively narrow macro panels. Among others, Judson 
and Owen (1999) present simulation results showing that when N is small bias-corrected 
LSDV estimators outperform IV-GMM estimators both in terms of bias and root mean 
squared. Therefore, we estimate equation (1) using a LSDVC estimator proposed by 
Bruno (2005) which is also suitable for unbalanced panels. 
                                                          
3 See, for instance, Afonso (2008a) for additional discussions and results on this issue, while Favero 
(2002) also reports that fiscal policy reacts to increases in debt. 
4 See Anderson and Hsiao (1982), Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
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2.1. The relevance of fiscal rules 
As one of the determinants of fiscal behaviour we also used several fiscal rule 
indicators, as described by Ayuso-i-Casals at al. (2007) and EC (2006), which try to 
model national numerical fiscal rules in the EU countries from 1990 to 2005. Fiscal 
rules played a relevant role during the fiscal consolidations in the latter part of the 
1990s.5 Well defined and targeted fiscal rules may help in promoting fiscal 
consolidation and can help attain and safeguard a sustainable fiscal position. Such 
indicators can be considered as part of the vector x of institutional and other control 
variables in (1), and can include, for instance, deficit rules or expenditure rules.
According to Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2007) there seems to be a link between 
numerical rules and budgetary outcomes, with an increase in the share of government 
finances covered by numerical fiscal rules leading to lower deficits. Moreover, they also 
argue that countries where numerical fiscal rules are designed in such a way as not to 
hamper the stabilisation function of fiscal policy the fiscal stance appears to behave 
more counter-cyclically. Debrun and Kumar (2007) and Debrun et al. (2008) also report 
that stricter and broader fiscal rules are associated with higher cyclically adjusted 
primary balances and that lower cyclically adjusted primary balances are also observed 
in election years. Wierts (2008) reports empirical evidence that expenditure rules can 
limit to some extent the expenditure bias. Additionally, Pina and Venes (2007) provide 
evidence that expenditure rules are associated to more prudent budget balance forecast 
errors.
                                                          
5 Hauptmeier, Heipertz and Schuknecht (2007) review cases of fiscal reform in several European 
countries, stressing the gains of ambitious and comprehensive reforms, notably on the expenditure side of 
budgets, while Afonso (2008b) studies fiscal consolidation episodes in the EU. For instance, Andersend 
and Minarik (2008) discuss design choices for fiscal rules. 
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2.2. The degree of government spending decentralization 
Another piece of information that may influence how successful the fiscal 
authorities are in determining fiscal policy can be the degree of government fiscal 
decentralization existing in a given country. The most common gauge for measuring 
fiscal decentralisation is the sub-national share of government spending and revenue, 
which varies considerably across countries.6
For instance, one could think that in a more centralised country, where most of 
the government spending occurs at the central government level, may perhaps be less 
difficult to reign in the budget deficit. In other words, in more decentralised institutional 
fiscal settings, the less significant could be the responses and improvements in the 
primary balance, since the coordination/control of the sectors/entities responsible for the 
final spending actions can be more difficult.7 Nevertheless, one should be aware that 
even if data are available regarding the structure of spending within the general 
government sub-sectors, the mandate to spend may still be allocated at the central level, 
but such information is then rather difficult to assess empirically. 
To assess the validity of the hypothesis that decentralisation at the spending 
level matters for fiscal behaviour, naturally linked to the existence and importance of 
sub-national government levels, we have built an indicator of government spending 
decentralisation, dec. This indicator is based on the general government sub-sectors 
classifications and is computed as the sum of government spending from the state 
(StateG), regional and local governments (RegLocG) sub-sectors over central (CenG),
state, regional and local government spending, therefore, excluding social security 
                                                          
6 See, for instance, OECD (2003). 
7 For a discussion on financial and spending decentralisation and fiscal federalism see notably Oates 
(1999). Stegarescu (2005) uses different measures of tax autonomy and revenue decentralisation to 
conduct revenue based assessment of public sector decentralisations in OECD countries, while von Hagen 




Working Paper Series No 1054
May 2009
spending. Indeed, we should consider the social security funds sub-sector as providing 
an overall service that is not directly linked to the spending decisions of the other sub-
sectors of the general government. Therefore, we have, for country i in period t:
decit=(StateGit + RegLocGit)/(CenGit+ StateGit + RegLocGit ), (2) 
which is computed with data from Eurostat. 8 In addition, we will also use a so-called 
revenue decentralization measure, computed as in (2), both for total revenues and for 
the sum of direct and indirect taxes. 
Table 1 illustrates the share of government spending, government revenue and 
tax revenue, ascribed to each sub-national government. For instance, it is possible to 
observe that the decentralisation of government spending was above 50 percent in 2005 
for Spain, Germany and Denmark, while being below 20 percent for Ireland, Portugal or 
Greece.
[Table 1] 
From an empirical perspective, the indicator of government spending 
decentralization can be interacted either with the government debt-to-GDP ratio or with 
the fiscal rule indicator. This can provide additional insight on how such variable 
influences overall government fiscal behaviour.
2.3. The relevance of the electoral cycle 
The differences in government’s behaviour, which take into account the 
electoral cycle, are predicted and discussed by the literature on the relations between 
elections and fiscal performance, which can be traced back to Nordhaus (1975) and 
                                                          
8 Using the ESA 95 structure, our government spending decentralisation indicator can be written as 
dec=(S1312 + S1313)/(S1311+S1312+S1313). The sub-level state government (S1312) is present in 
federal states such as Austria, Germany and Spain, while in most European Union countries the 
distinction is essentially between central government (S1311) and local/regional government (S1313). 
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Hibbs (1977), respectively regarding opportunistic and partisan cycles.9 We assess the 
influence of the electoral budget cycle on fiscal behaviour by using a dummy 
variable, EitD , defined as 





D . (3) 
In order to test the relevance of the electoral cycle, the fiscal policy reaction 
function can be amended to include an interaction term between, for instance, b and the 
dummy variable for the elections, 
1 1 1 2 1 1(1 )
E E
it i it it it it it it it it its s D b D b z f x u . (4) 
The hypothesis to be tested is whether when there is an election governments 
choose to deliver a more expansionary fiscal policy, therefore allowing for a more 
mitigated response of the primary balance to increases in the government debt. In other 
words, if indeed electoral budget cycles play a role in the government’s fiscal decisions. 
For instance, Afonso (2008a) reports results for the period 1970-2003 showing 
that the EU-15 governments have a tendency to use the primary budget surplus to 
reduce the public debt-to-GDP ratio. This response seems to be higher the higher is the 
level of government indebtedness while governments also seem to improve the primary 
budget balance as a result of increases in the outstanding stock of government debt. 
Additionally, the results reported by Afonso (2008a) also indicate that primary balances 
react positively and in a statistically significant way to government debt, when there are 
no parliamentary elections in the next period, but this is not the overall case if there are 
elections.
                                                          
9 Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Alesina and Roubini (1992) provided subsequent related work. 
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3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Primary balance reaction functions 
Our data set is mostly taken from the European Commission Ameco database. 
Since we are also interested in assessing the relevance of the existence of fiscal rules, 
the data availability for this variable essentially restrains the time series dimension of 
our panel to the period 1990-2005.10 We consider the 27 countries of the European 
Union at that end of the period under analysis, even if some countries can be excluded 
in some specifications due to missing data for some variables, which means we estimate 
a dynamic unbalanced panel specification.11 The panel unit root test results, reported in 
Appendix A, reveal that the null unit root hypothesis can be rejected at the ten per cent 
level of significance for all or most of the cases, thus supporting the stationarity of our 
fiscal variables and of the output gap.
Table 2 presents the results for the baseline fiscal reaction function, drawing on 
specification (1) for the primary balance, using the (corrected) least square dummy 
variable estimator.12 It is possible to observe that the primary balance reaction to 
government debt is statistically different from zero and positive, i.e. >0. In other 
words, the EU 27 governments seem to act in accordance with the existing stock of 
government debt, by increasing the primary balance surplus as a result of increases in 
the outstanding stock of government debt. This is consistent with the prevalence of a 
                                                          
10 The data for the fiscal rules were provided by Ayuso-i-Casals et al (2007), and were computed on the 
basis of the responses to a questionnaire sent by the European Commission to the EU Member States, in 
the context of the Economic Policy Committee Working Group on the Quality of Public Finances. Data 
on parliamentary elections were obtained from the following sources:  
http://www.idea.int/vt/total_number_of_elections.cfm and http://electionresources.org/.
11 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain , France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
12 For comparison purposes, selected OLS results are reported in Appendix B. 
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fiscal regime, where the fiscal authorities respond in a “stabilising” manner by 
increasing primary balances when the debt ratio increases.  
[Table 2] 
Still considering Table 2, the fiscal position also improves when the existing 
general government fiscal rule is stronger, i.e. >0, and the same is true for the case of 
the central and balanced budget fiscal rules. Interestingly, this effect is more absent for 
the case of sub-national government fiscal rules (see regressions 2 and 5 in Table 2). 
Moreover, results indicate that the existence of parliamentary elections negatively 
impinge on the improvement of the fiscal position.  
In order to assess the relevance of the run-up to EMU and the importance of the 
SGP effect, we have included additional explanatory dummy variables in the baseline 
regression. Therefore, the EMU dummy assumes the value one for EU15 countries 
between 1994 and 1998, and zero otherwise; the SGP dummy takes the value one after 
1997 for the countries that are (adhered) in (to) the EU, and zero otherwise. From Table 
2, the results show that both the EMU (only in the LSDVC estimations) and the SGP 
dummy variables have a statistically significant positive effect on the improvement of 
the fiscal position, which may imply an increased effort pursued by the EU countries to 
comply with the existing EU fiscal framework.  
The relevance of government indebtedness can be further assessed using 
interaction terms between the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio and alternative debt ratio 
thresholds (60, 70, or 80 percent). In other words, the debt threshold dummy 
variables, THitD , are defined as follows: 
1,  if debt ratio > TH, in country i in period t 
,  TH=0.6, 0.7, 0.8
0,  otherwise
TH
itD . (5) 
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Table 3 provides the set of results with the above mentioned dummy variables, 
and it is possible to observe that the responsiveness of the primary balance to 
government debt is rather similar and only marginally lower when the debt-to-GDP 
ratio is above the higher threshold. This could imply that the authorities find it more 
difficult to increase primary surpluses when facing higher government debt ratios. 
Interestingly, adding an enlargement dummy, which has the value one for the New 
Member States after they join the EU, and zero otherwise, it is possible to capture a 
decreasing effect on primary balances. 
[Table 3] 
Taking advantage of the debt ratio threshold dummy variables defined in (5) we 
can interact them with the overall fiscal rule at our disposal. The results reported in 
Table 4 show that when the debt-to-GDP ratio is below the debt thresholds of 60, 70 or 
80 percent a stronger overall fiscal rule contributes to improve the primary budget 
balance (columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 4). On the other hand, if the debt ratio is above the 
aforementioned debt thresholds, the existence of the fiscal rule does not statistically 
contribute to improve the fiscal behaviour of the government. Therefore, both lower 
debt ratios and strong fiscal rules seem to be a good strategy for a better fiscal response 
from primary balances. Interestingly, at the debt ratio threshold of 80 percent, the effect 
of the overall fiscal rule comes out as less relevant for the improvement of the primary 
balance. In addition, only for the debt ratio threshold of 70 per cent is the null 
hypothesis of equal responses from the primary balance rejected. 
[Table 4] 
Table 5 reports the results regarding the analysis of whether government 
spending decentralisation is relevant for fiscal behaviour using the decentralisation 
variable constructed above in (2). 
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[Table 5] 
According to Table 5, a higher degree of government spending decentralisation 
has a statistically significant negative effect on primary balances, when the 
decentralisation variable is used together with the debt ratio. An increase in the 
decentralisation variable (an increase in the share of non-central government spending 
over total government spending, excluding social security funds) worsens the primary 
balance. A similarly constructed tax decentralisation variable does not show up as 
statistically significant. 
3.2. Primary spending reaction functions 
In order to complement our analysis, we also specify a fiscal policy reaction 
function for primary spending, along the lines of the one used so far for the primary 
balance:
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 5 6it i it it it it it itps w w ps w b w z w f w x w t v , (6) 
where ps is the primary spending-to-GDP ratio, and the other variables are similar to 
what was already mentioned for the primary balance specification in (1). Additionally, 
we now also include in the fiscal rule indicator, f, an expenditure rule. Tables 6 to 7 
provide the set of results for the alternative estimation of the primary spending reaction 
function (6). Again, we take account of a potential bias resulting from the dynamic 
specification of our regression equation by using the bias corrected least square dummy 
variable estimator. 
[Table 6] 
From Table 6 we see that the EMU and the SGP dummy variables, in contrast to 
our results for the primary balance, do not affect primary spending significantly. The 
overall government fiscal rule exerts a negative impact on primary government 
18
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expenditure, which, however, is only statistically significant if we perform standard 
least square dummy variable estimation. When correcting for the dynamic panel bias the 
effect turns insignificant. In contrast, the negative impact of fiscal rules at the sub-
national level turns out to be robust with regard to the estimation procedure. This 
suggests a particular relevance of fiscal rules at the regional/local level for containing 
general government spending. Interestingly, the expenditure rule is not statistically 
significant, albeit the estimated coefficient has the right sign (columns 3 and 6 in Table 
6). On the other hand, elections have the effect of rising primary spending, but this 
effect is not statistically significant in all specifications.
The interaction terms between the level of government indebtedness and the 
debt ratio thresholds, reported in Table 7, show that when debt increases the 
governments decrease primary spending in the next period but essentially if the debt 
ratio is below the 80 percent threshold.  This result is consistent with our previous 
finding that governments were more able to improve their primary budget balances 
when government indebtedness was below the debt thresholds.
[Table 7] 
The results of the interaction between the overall general government fiscal rule 
and the debt threshold dummy variables are reported in Table 8. In contrast to the case 
of the primary balance reaction function, we do not observe that the level of debt 
matters for the effectiveness of fiscal rules, regarding the effect on primary spending. In 
addition, there is no evidence that the magnitude of the effect of the fiscal rule in 
reducing primary spending is higher when the government indebtedness is beyond or 
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Turning now to the issue of spending decentralisation we observe from Table 9 
that higher decentralisation increases primary spending, an effect that is mostly 
statistically significant.  In addition, it is possible to conclude that for very high levels of 
government indebtedness (above 80% of GDP), the positive effect of spending 
decentralisation on primary spending is also higher (see column 5 in Table 9). 
Therefore, increasing (decreasing) the share of non-central (central) government 
spending in total (minus social security) spending contributes to an increase in the total 
primary spending-to-GDP ratio in the subsequent period. 
[Table 9] 
We also report in Table 10 the estimated specifications using the election 
dummy variable, for the fiscal reaction function of primary balance, cyclically adjusted 
primary balance, and primary spending. Note that we use an alternative version of the 
election interaction in (4), in order to more easily discriminate the election effects, since 
the estimated coefficients for the version in (4) are quite close. Thus, we estimated, for 
instance, the following specification for the primary balance, 
1 1... ...
E
it i it it it its b D b u , (7) 
It is possible to observe, from (7) and from (4), that when there are no elections 
( 0EitD ) we have = 2 and when there are elections ( 1
E
itD ) we have = 1.
[Table 10] 
According to the results from Table 10 we can see, for instance, that the 
improvement of the primary balance, as a response to the debt, decreases slightly when 
an election occurs (  is negative and statistically significant). The same result is visible 
for the cyclically adjusted primary balance. On the other hand, the consolidation effort 
via the reduction of primary spending, as a result of an increase in the government 
indebtedness, is not affected in the event of a parliamentary election. 
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4. Conclusion 
In this paper we estimated dynamic panel data specifications to assess the 
determinants of government’s fiscal behaviour for the 27 EU countries for the period 
between 1990 and 2005. Our analysis focussed on the responses, to several 
determinants, of primary budget balances and primary spending.  
According to our results, the EU 27 governments increase the primary balance 
surplus as a result of increases in the outstanding stock of government debt. Both EMU 
and SGP arrangements have a statistically significant positive effect on the 
improvement of the fiscal position, which may imply an increased effort pursued by the 
EU countries to comply with the existing EU fiscal framework. On the other hand, we 
do not observe a statistically significant effect on primary spending. It is also possible to 
conclude that when the debt-to-GDP ratio is below the debt threshold of 80 percent a 
stronger overall fiscal rule contributes to improve the primary budget balance. 
Moreover, parliamentary elections negatively impinge on the improvement of the 
primary balance. 
Regarding public spending decentralization, increasing the ratio of state plus 
local spending over central government spending contributes to an increase in the total 
primary spending-to-GDP ratio in the subsequent period. Moreover, when the debt ratio 
is above the 80 percent threshold we observe a more negative effect of the 
decentralisation proxy on primary balances. For instance, an increase of 1 percentage 
point of GDP in the decentralisation variable worsens the primary balance by 0.1 
percentage points of GDP. In addition, for a higher level of government indebtedness, 
the positive effect of spending decentralisation on primary spending is also higher. 
All in all, we can say that the existence of fiscal rules and a lower degree of 
public spending decentralization positively contribute to a higher responsiveness of 
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primary surpluses to government indebtedness (a more Ricardian behaviour of the fiscal 
authorities in the EU), while the electoral cycle also has the expected effect. In terms of 
future work, one can think, for instance, of assessing other measures of fiscal 
decentralization or alternative data regarding the proxy for fiscal rules.  
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Table 1 – Share of sub-national spending/revenue in government spending/revenue 
(State + Local)/(Central+ State + Local), % 
 Spending Revenue Taxes (direct + indirect) 
 1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005 
Austria 39.1 40.8 36.9 43.7 42.6 38.8 31.2 28.5 26.5 
Belgium 34.3 39.9 42.8 39.3 40.2 43.0 8.4 8.6 13.4 
Bulgaria   19.5 17.3  16.9 1.2 
Cyprus  4.4 5.6 5.2 6.2  2.1 1.5 
Czech Republic  23.6 27.2 24.7 29.5   20.8 26.2 
Denmark 43.4 47.1 50.4 44.8 46.8 46.4 31.9 35.1 34.1 
Estonia 23.4 25.5 22.4 23.6  21.6 20.0 
Finland 44.2 41.1 43.5 43.7 38.4 42.3 29.0 29.5 29.0 
France 27.9 29.4 31.6 28.7 31.8 33.9 18.6 19.5 22.1 
Germany  64.0 58.2 61.5 60.8   50.8 49.8 
Greece 6.5 7.9 7.7 9.6   1.3 1.5 
Hungary  28.4 28.4 29.9 33.1  14.5 17.6 
Ireland 25.9 32.8 18.5 27.6 29.2 18.9 2.9 2.3 2.7 
Italy 26.7 35.0 36.8 31.0 35.7 39.1 7.9 20.5 23.3 
Latvia  33.0 30.4 34.7 31.7   25.5 24.3 
Lithuania  29.8 28.3 32.6 29.0   32.4 15.4 
Luxembourg 19.1 16.3 15.2 18.0 16.1 15.0 8.8 7.8 6.3 
Malta  1.7 1.3 2.3 1.7    
Netherlands 34.7 38.6 37.5 38.6 38.2 37.1 4.3 5.6 6.3 
Poland 36.9 34.9 37.8 39.3   20.4 20.4 
Portugal 13.9 16.9 16.1 14.8 17.3 18.8 8.3 8.8 9.6 
Romania   26.5 27.7   33.0 
Slovakia 6.6 24.1 10.6 26.3  6.6 19.3 
Slovenia 22.2 22.6 24.3 23.8  11.9 11.8 
Spain 46.7 58.2 47.4 57.5   24.7 45.7 
Sweden  42.6 44.2 39.9 44.4   39.4 43.7 
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Table 2 – Fiscal reaction function for the primary balance 
(fixed-effects, 1990-2005) 
Notes: The t (z) statistics are in parentheses in specifications 1-3 (4-6).  
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 countries 
between 1994 and 1998, 0 otherwise. SGP dummy, 1 after 1997 for the countries that are (adhered) in (to) the EU, 0 
otherwise.
1) Standard least square dummy variable estimator. 
2) Bias corrected least square dummy variable estimator proposed by Bruno (2005). 
3) F-statistic tests for fixed effects, H0: fixed effects jointly insignificant. F(24,262)-values reported, 1% critical 
value = 1.83. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 LSDV1) LSDVC2)
Primary balance (-1) 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 
 (5.59) (5.47) (5.57) (8.09) (7.91) (7.95) 
Debt (-1) 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04** 0.03** 0.03** 
 (3.84) (3.57) (3.65) (2.55) (2.22) (2.30) 
Output gap (-1) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 
 (0.61) (0.70) (0.49) (0.49) (0.54) (0.34) 
EMU dummy 0.78 0.86 0.81 0.87* 0.94* 0.90* 
 (1.30) (1.43) (1.35) (1.75) (1.86) (1.78) 
SGP dummy 1.04* 1.02* 1.13** 0.99* 0.98* 1.08* 
 (1.96) (1.90) (2.10) (1.80) (1.78) (1.94) 
Election dummy -0.42* -0.41* -0.42* -0.43* -0.42* -0.43* 
 (-1.97) (-1.89) (-1.95) (-1.83) (-1.77) (-1.79) 
General government fiscal rule (-1) 0.40***   0.54**   
 (5.59)   (2.56)   
Central government fiscal rule (-1)  0.41**   0.37*  
  (2.29)   (1.82)  
Sub-national government fiscal rule (-1)  0.36   0.37  
  (1.02)   (1.21)  
Budget balance fiscal rule (-1)   0.59***   0.60*** 
   (3.81)   (2.82) 
Observations 308 308 308 308 308 308 
adj R2 0.47 0.47 0.47    
F-test3) 2.31 2.31 2.52    
26
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1054
May 2009
Table 3 – Fiscal reaction function for the primary balance (fixed-effects, 1990-2005), 
the relevance of debt thresholds (LSDVC) 
  1 2 3 
Primary balance (-1) 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.50*** 
 (8.13) (8.15) (8.43) 
Output gap (-1) 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.42) 
EMU dummy 0.84* 0.84* 0.66 
 (1.66) (1.68) (1.42) 
SGP dummy 0.98* 0.99* 0.90* 
 (1.77) (1.79) (1.65) 
Enlargement dummy -0.43* -0.43* -0.41* 
 (-1.82) (-1.84) (-1.74) 
Election dummy 0.53** 0.54** 0.57*** 
 (2.49) (2.54) (2.67) 
General government fiscal rule (-1) 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.50*** 
  (8.13) (8.15) (8.43) 
D60 (-1) x Debt (-1) [a] 0.04**   
 (2.37)   
(1 - D60 (-1)) x Debt (-1) [b] 0.04**   
 (2.04)   
D70 (-1) x Debt (-1) [c]  0.04**  
  (2.51)  
(1 - D70 (-1)) x Debt (-1) [d]  0.04**  
  (2.13)  
D80 (-1) x Debt (-1) [e]   0.03** 
   (2.46) 
(1 - D80 (-1)) x Debt (-1) [f]   0.05*** 
   (3.20) 
Observations 308 308 308 
Wald test1), H0: a=b; c=d; e=f 0.63 0.77 0.10 
Notes: The z statistics are in parentheses.  
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 
countries between 1994 and 1998, 0 otherwise. SGP dummy, 1 after 1997 for the countries that are (adhered) in (to) 
the EU, 0 otherwise. Enlargement dummy, 1 for the New Member States after entering the EU, 0 otherwise. 
1) p-values reported. 
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Table 4 – Fiscal reaction function for the primary balance (fixed-effects, 1990-2005), 
the relevance of fiscal rules (LSDVC) 
  1 2 3 4 
Primary balance (-1) 0.50*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 
 (8.22) (7.95) (8.10) (8.16) 
Debt (-1) 0.04*** 0.03** 0.03** 0.04** 
 (2.64) (2.37) (2.04) (2.33) 
Output gap (-1) 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 
 (0.49) (0.52) (0.60) (0.49) 
EMU dummy 0.79 0.87* 1.00* 0.87* 
 (1.59) (1.74) (1.95) (1.75) 
SGP dummy 0.95* 0.99* 0.95* 1.00* 
 (1.71) (1.78) (1.73) (1.80) 
Enlargement dummy -0.44* -0.44* -0.45* -0.43* 
 (-1.86) (-1.84) (-1.94) (-1.82) 
Election dummy 0.50*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 
 (8.22) (7.95) (8.10) (8.16) 
Fisrulov (-1) x Debt (-1) 0.01*    
 (1.66)    
Fisrulov (-1) x D60 (-1) [a]  0.30   
  (1.01)   
Fisrulov (-1) x (1 - D60 (-1)) [b]  0.61***   
  (2.72)   
Fisrulov (-1) x D70 (-1) [c]   -0.05  
   (-0.13)  
Fisrulov (-1) x (1 - D70 (-1)) [d]   0.64***  
   (2.84)  
Fisrulov (-1) x D80 (-1) [e]    0.51 
    (0.73) 
Fisrulov (-1) x (1 - D80 (-1)) [f]    0.54** 
    (2.55) 
Observations 308 308 308 308 
Wald test1), H0: a=b; c=d; e=f  0.26 0.07 0.96 
Notes: The z statistics are in parentheses.  
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 
countries between 1994 and 1998, 0 otherwise. SGP dummy, 1 after 1997 for the countries that are 
(adhered) in (to) the EU, 0 otherwise. Enlargement dummy, 1 for the New Member States after entering the 
EU, 0 otherwise. 
1) p-values reported. 
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Table 5 – Fiscal reaction function for the primary balance (fixed-effects, 1990-2005), 
the relevance of government spending and revenue decentralisation (LSDVC) 
  1 2 3 4 
Primary balance (-1) 0.52*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 
 (9.43) (9.89) (9.57) (9.19) 
Debt (-1) 0.03** 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 
 (2.50) (3.50) (2.92) (3.09) 
Output gap (-1) 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 
 (1.17) (1.35) (1.15) (1.19) 
EMU dummy 0.58 0.32 0.53 0.48 
 (1.00) (0.56) (0.91) (0.82) 
SGP dummy 1.17*** 1.18*** 1.15*** 1.12** 
 (2.65) (2.84) (2.61) (2.57) 
Enlargement dummy -0.37* -0.40* -0.35* -0.37* 
 (-1.71) (-1.91) (-1.66) (-1.73) 
Election dummy 0.48*** 0.43*** 0.50*** 0.43** 
 (2.85) (2.58) (2.95) (2.46) 
General government fiscal rule (-1) 0.52*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 
  (9.43) (9.89) (9.57) (9.19) 
Subnational expenditure share (-1) -0.04    
 (-0.84)    
Subn. exp. share (-1) x Debt (-1)   -0.00**   
  (-2.46)   
Subnational tax share (-1)   -0.00  
   (-0.01)  
Subn. tax share (-1) x Debt (-1)    -0.00 
    (-1.55) 
Observations 291 291 291 291 
Notes: The z statistics are in parentheses.  
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 countries 
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Table 6 – Fiscal reaction function for the primary spending 
(fixed-effects, 1990-2005) 
Notes: The t (z) statistics are in parentheses in specifications 1-3 (4-6).  
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 countries 
between 1994 and 1998, 0 otherwise. SGP dummy, 1 after 1997 for the countries that are (adhered) in (to) the EU, 0 
otherwise.
1) Standard least square dummy variable estimator. 
2) Bias corrected least square dummy variable estimator proposed by Bruno (2005). 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 LSDV1) LSDVC2)
Primary expenditure (-1) 0.67*** 0.66*** 0.69*** 0.76*** 0.75*** 0.78*** 
 (8.16) (8.33) (8.62) (12.70) (12.45) (13.09) 
Debt (-1) -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 (-0.40) (-0.00) (-0.57) (0.21) (0.52) (0.07) 
Output gap (-1) 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 
 (1.05) (1.19) (0.91) (0.95) (1.08) (0.84) 
EMU dummy -0.39 -0.52 -0.27 -0.26 -0.40 -0.16 
 (-0.54) (-0.71) (-0.37) (-0.43) (-0.67) (-0.27) 
SGP dummy -0.23 -0.27 -0.15 -0.12 -0.18 -0.08 
 (-0.36) (-0.42) (-0.23) (-0.19) (-0.29) (-0.13) 
Election dummy 0.39 0.36 0.42 0.41 0.37 0.43 
 (1.52) (1.40) (1.63) (1.47) (1.37) (1.59) 
General government fiscal rule (-1) -0.42**   -0.36   
 (-2.21)   (-1.40)   
Central government fiscal rule (-1)  -0.28   -0.24  
  (-1.56)   (-0.98)  
Sub-national government fiscal rule (-1)  -0.75*   -0.70*  
  (-1.93)   (-1.88)  
Expenditure rule (-1)   -0.17   -0.07 
   (-1.21)   (-0.27) 
Observations 308 308 308 308 308 308 
adj R2 0.56 0.56 0.55    
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Table 7 – Fiscal reaction function for the primary spending (fixed-effects, 1990-2005), 
the relevance of debt thresholds (LSDVC) 
  1 2 3 
Primary expenditure (-1) 0.76*** 0.74*** 0.76*** 
 (12.67) (12.06) (12.62) 
Output gap (-1) 0.07 0.07 0.08 
 (0.93) (0.90) (1.05) 
EMU dummy -0.15 -0.10 0.19 
 (-0.25) (-0.17) (0.34) 
SGP dummy -0.10 -0.09 0.01 
 (-0.16) (-0.15) (0.02) 
Election dummy 0.42 0.42 0.36 
 (1.50) (1.53) (1.32) 
General government fiscal rule (-1) -0.33 -0.38 -0.46* 
  (-1.25) (-1.48) (-1.75) 
D60 (-1) x Debt (-1) [a] -0.00   
 (-0.22)   
(1 - D60 (-1)) x Debt (-1) [b] -0.02   
 (-0.64)   
D70 (-1) x Debt (-1) [c]  -0.00  
  (-0.06)  
(1 - D70 (-1)) x Debt (-1) [d]  -0.02  
  (-0.90)  
D80 (-1) x Debt (-1) [e]   0.00 
   (0.21) 
(1 - D80 (-1)) x Debt (-1) [f]   -0.03* 
   (-1.69) 
Observations 308 308 308 
Wald tes(1), H0: a=b; c=d; e=f 0.19 0.04 0.00 
Notes: The z statistics are in parentheses.  
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 
countries between 1994 and 1998, 0 otherwise. SGP dummy, 1 after 1997 for the countries that are 
(adhered) in (to) the EU, 0 otherwise. 
(1) p-values reported. 
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Table 8 – Fiscal reaction function for the primary spending (fixed-effects, 1990-2005), 
the relevance of fiscal rules (LSDVC) 
  1 2 3 4 
Primary expenditure (-1) 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 
 (12.92) (12.79) (13.13) (12.92) 
Debt (-1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.19) (0.26) (-0.04) 
Output gap (-1) 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
 (0.98) (0.96) (0.94) (0.97) 
EMU dummy -0.24 -0.25 -0.27 -0.21 
 (-0.39) (-0.41) (-0.43) (-0.33) 
SGP dummy -0.14 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12 
 (-0.21) (-0.19) (-0.16) (-0.18) 
Election dummy 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.40 
 (1.46) (1.46) (1.50) (1.45) 
Fisrulov (-1) x Debt (-1) -0.01    
 (-1.47)    
Fisrulov (-1) x D60 (-1)[a]  -0.44   
  (-1.25)   
Fisrulov (-1) x (1 - D60 (-1)) [b]  -0.35   
  (-1.26)   
Fisrulov (-1) x D70 (-1) [c]   -0.26  
   (-0.58)  
Fisrulov (-1) x (1 - D70 (-1)) [d]   -0.38  
   (-1.36)  
Fisrulov (-1) x D80 (-1) [e]    -0.98 
    (-1.13) 
Fisrulov (-1) x (1 - D80 (-1)) [f]    -0.36 
    (-1.37) 
Observations 308 308 308 308 
Wald test(1), H0: a=b; c=d; e=f 0.79 0.81 0.46 0.79 
Notes: The z statistics are in parentheses.  
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 countries 
between 1994 and 1998, 0 otherwise. SGP dummy, 1 after 1997 for the countries that are (adhered) in (to) the EU, 0 
otherwise. (1) p-values reported. 
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Table 9 – Fiscal reaction function for the primary spending (fixed-effects, 1990-2005), 
the relevance of government spending decentralisation (LSDVC) 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Primary expenditure (-1) 0.81*** 0.80*** 0.81*** 0.80*** 0.80*** 
 (16.14) (15.66) (15.79) (16.85) (15.95) 
Debt (-1) 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (-1.33) (-0.33) (-0.48) (-0.82) 
Output gap (-1) -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 
 (-0.00) (-0.12) (0.01) (-0.10) (0.28) 
EMU dummy 0.48 0.70 0.56 0.58 0.79 
 (0.75) (1.01) (0.84) (0.91) (1.22) 
SGP dummy -0.37 -0.22 -0.34 -0.30 -0.28 
 (-0.69) (-0.42) (-0.62) (-0.59) (-0.52) 
Election dummy 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.32 
 (1.40) (1.35) (1.42) (1.47) (1.33) 
General government fiscal rule (-1) -0.18 -0.16 -0.14 -0.18 -0.26 
  (-0.82) (-0.72) (-0.62) (-0.83) (-1.17) 
Subnational expenditure share (-1) 0.12**     
 (2.20)     
Subn. exp. share (-1) x Debt (-1)  0.00    
  (1.34)    
Subn. exp. share (-1) x D60  (-1) [a]   0.13**   
   (2.42)   
Subn. exp. share (-1) x (1 - D60)  (-1) [b]   0.12**   
   (2.20)   
Subn. exp. share (-1) x D70  (-1) [c]    0.13**  
    (2.26)  
Subn. exp. share (-1) x (1 - D70)  (-1) [d]    0.11*  
    (1.87)  
Subn. exp. share (-1) x D80  (-1) [e]     0.17*** 
     (2.66) 
Subn. exp. share (-1) x (1 - D80)  (-1) [f]     0.10* 
     (1.83) 
Observations 291 291 291 291 291 
Wald test(1), H0: a=b; c=d; e=f   0.35 0.22 0.03 
Notes: The z statistics are in parentheses.  
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 countries 
between 1994 and 1998, 0 otherwise. SGP dummy, 1 after 1997 for the countries that are (adhered) in (to) the EU, 0 
otherwise. (1) p-values reported. 
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Table 10 – Fiscal reaction functions (fixed-effects, 1990-2005), the relevance of 
elections (LSDVC) 







Primary balance (-1) 0.48*** 0.51***  
 (8.04) (8.74)  
Cyclically adjusted primary balance (-1)    
    
Primary expenditure (-1)   0.76*** 
   (12.70) 
Output gap (-1) 0.03 -0.05 0.07 
 (0.43) (-0.80) (1.00) 
EMU dummy 0.90* 1.18** -0.30 
 (1.83) (2.43) (-0.50) 
SGP dummy 1.02* 0.35 -0.15 
 (1.86) (0.64) (-0.23) 
General government fiscal rule (-1) 0.55*** 0.48** -0.38 
  (2.63) (2.33) (-1.45) 
Debt (-1) [ ] 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.00 
 (2.68) (2.69) (0.13) 
Election dummy x Debt (-1) [ ] -0.01* -0.01* 0.01 
 (-1.65) (-1.73) (1.36) 
Observations 308 308 308 
Notes: The z statistics are in parentheses.  
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 
countries between 1994 and 1998, 0 otherwise. SGP dummy, 1 after 1997 for the countries that are (adhered) in 
(to) the EU, 0 otherwise. 
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. 
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Appendix A – Panel unit root results 
The test proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) has been widely implemented in 
empirical research due to its rather simple methodology and alternative hypothesis of 
heterogeneity. This test assumes cross-sectional independence among panel units 
(except for common time effects), but allows for heterogeneity in the form of individual 
deterministic effects (constant and/or linear time trend), and heterogeneous serial 
correlation structure of the error terms. We also provide the results of four other panel 
unit root tests: Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Breitung (2000), and Fisher-type tests using 
ADF and PP tests (Maddala and Wu, 1999). The results reveal that the null unit root 
hypothesis can be rejected at the ten per cent level of significance for all or most of the 
cases, thus supporting the stationarity of our fiscal variables and of the output gap.
Table A1 – Summary of panel data unit root tests for the primary balance (1989-2007) 
Method Statistic P-value* Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t stat -2.96244  0.0015  27  382 
Breitung t-stat -3.83851  0.0001  27  355 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -3.33215  0.0004  27  382 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  90.1764  0.0015  27  382 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  139.209  0.0000  27  409 
* Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests 
assume asymptotic normality. 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel 
Table A2 – Summary of panel data unit root tests for the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
(1989-2007) 
Method Statistic P-value* Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t stat -2.77439  0.0028  27  362 
Breitung t-stat -2.50251  0.0062  27  335 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -2.18863  0.0143  27  362 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  75.4207  0.0287  27  362 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  122.766  0.0000  27  389 
* Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests 
assume asymptotic normality. 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel 
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Table A3 – Summary of panel data unit root tests for primary spending (1989-2007) 
Method Statistic P-value* Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t stat -3.15825  0.0008  27  367 
Breitung t-stat -0.72843  0.2332  27  340 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -1.91864  0.0275  27  367 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  76.1583  0.0252  27  367 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  115.117  0.0000  27  394 
* Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests 
assume asymptotic normality. 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel 
Table A4 – Summary of panel data unit root tests for government debt (1989-2007) 
Method Statistic P-value* Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t stat -4.71615  0.0000  27  374 
Breitung t-stat  1.17238  0.8795  27  347 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.71615  0.0000  27  374 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  1.17238  0.8795  27  347 
PP - Fisher Chi-square -4.71615  0.0000  27  374 
* Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests 
assume asymptotic normality. 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel 
Table A5 – Summary of panel data unit root tests for the output gap (1989-2007) 
Method Statistic P-value* Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t stat -8.13987  0.0000  27  385 
Breitung t-stat -2.66883  0.0038  27  358 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -6.72503  0.0000  27  385 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  147.944  0.0000  27  385 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  76.2926  0.0246  27  412 
* Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests 
assume asymptotic normality. 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett kernel 
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Appendix B – OLS results 
Table B1 – Fiscal reaction function for the primary balance 
(fixed-effects, 1990-2005) 
  1 2  3 
Primary balance (-1) 0.47 *** 0.46 *** 0.47 *** 
 6.56  6.31  6.55  
Debt (-1) 0.05 *** 0.04 *** 0.05 *** 
 4.17  3.98  4.07  
Output gap (-1) 0.08  0.08  0.08  
 1.29  1.31  1.22  
EMU dummy 0.70 *** 0.77 *** 0.75 *** 
 3.21  3.57  3.49  
SGP dummy 0.47 * 0.56 ** 0.55 ** 
 1.84  2.27  2.23  
Enlargement dummy 0.33  0.24  0.28  
 0.74  0.54  0.64  
Election dummy -0.52 ** -0.51 ** -0.52 ** 
 -2.40  -2.34  -2.40  
General government fiscal rule (-1) 0.37 ** -  -  
 2.36      
Central government fiscal rule (-1) -  0.35 * -  
   1.85    
Sub-national government fiscal rule (-1) -  0.17  -  
   0.50    
Budget balance fiscal rule (-1) -  -  0.39 ** 
     2.41  
Observations 308  308  308  
adj R2 0.71  0.71  0.71  
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. 
 *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 
countries between 1994 and 1998, 0 otherwise. SGP dummy, 1 after 1997 for the countries that are 
(adhered) in (to) the EU, 0 otherwise. Enlargement dummy, 1 for the New Member States after 
 entering the EU, 0 otherwise. 
37
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1054
May 2009
Table B2 – Fiscal reaction function for the primary balance (fixed-effects, 1990-2005), 
the relevance of debt thresholds 
  1   2   3   
Primary balance (-1) 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.48 *** 
 6.52  6.50  6.47  
Debt (-1) -  -  -  
     
Output gap (-1) 0.08  0.08  0.08  
 1.29  1.29  1.17  
EMU dummy 0.69*** 0.65*** 0.55 ** 
 3.19  2.91  2.39  
SGP dummy 0.47* 0.37  0.36  
 1.83  1.32  1.35  
Enlargement dummy 0.33  0.42  0.32 * 
 0.74  0.91  0.72  
Election dummy -0.52** -0.53** -0.49 ** 
 -2.41  -2.41  -2.25  
General government fiscal rule (-1) 0.36** 0.36** 0.41 *** 
  2.29   2.34   2.62   
D60 (-1) x Debt (-1) 0.05*** -  -  
 3.93      
(1 - D60 (-1)) x Debt (-1) 0.05*** -  -  
 3.23    
D70 (-1) x Debt (-1) -  0.05*** -  
   4.21    
(1 - D70 (-1)) x Debt (-1) -  0.06*** -  
   3.71    
D80 (-1) x Debt (-1) -  -  0.05 *** 
     4.25  
(1 - D80 (-1)) x Debt (-1) -  -  0.07 *** 
   4.65  
Observations 308   308   308   
adj R2 0.71   0.71   0.72   
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. 
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 countries 
between 1994 and 1998, 0 otherwise. SGP dummy, 1 after 1997 for the countries that are (adhered) in (to) the EU, 0 
otherwise. Enlargement dummy, 1 for the New Member States after  entering the EU, 0 otherwise. 
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Table B3 – Fiscal reaction function for the primary balance (fixed-effects, 1990-2005), 
the relevance of fiscal rules 
  1 2 3  4 
Primary balance (-1) 0.48 *** 0.47 *** 0.46 *** 0.47 *** 
 6.67  6.51  6.49  6.47  
Debt (-1) 0.05  0.05 *** 0.04 *** 0.05 *** 
 4.26  4.17  3.77  4.09  
Output gap (-1) 0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  
 1.18  1.29  1.34  1.29  
EMU dummy 0.65  0.70 *** 0.83 *** 0.69 *** 
 2.94  3.20  3.67  3.09  
SGP dummy 0.58 *** 0.48 * 0.47 * 0.47 * 
 2.22  1.84  1.82  1.80  
Enlargement dummy 0.27 *** 0.32  0.28  0.33  
 0.62  0.72  0.64  0.74  
Election dummy -0.53  -0.52 ** -0.54 ** -0.52 ** 
 -2.43  -2.41  -2.47  -2.4  
Fisrulov (-1) x Debt (-1) 0.00 *** -  -  -  
 1.97        
Fisrulov (-1) x D60 (-1) -  0.35 * -  -  
   1.69      
Fisrulov (-1) x (1 - D60 (-1)) -  0.37 ** -  -  
   2.16      
Fisrulov (-1) x D70 (-1) -    -0.143  -  
     -0.55    
Fisrulov (-1) x (1 - D70 (-1)) -  -  0.46 *** -  
     2.71    
Fisrulov (-1) x D80 (-1) -  -  -  0.51  
       1.06  
Fisrulov (-1) x (1 - D80 (-1)) -  -  -  0.36 *** 
       2.33  
Observations 319  308  308  308   
adj R2 0.72  0.71  0.72  0.71   
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. 
 *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 
countries between 1994 and 1998, 0 otherwise. SGP dummy, 1 after 1997 for the countries that are 
(adhered) in (to) the EU, 0 otherwise. Enlargement dummy, 1 for the New Member States after entering the 
EU, 0 otherwise. 
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Table B4 – Fiscal reaction function for the primary balance (fixed-effects, 1990-2005),
the relevance of government spending decentralisation 
  1   2   3   4   5   
Primary balance (-1) 0.53 *** 0.51 *** 0.53 *** 0.53 *** 0.54 ***
 8.14  7.21  8.12  8.09  8.05  
Debt (-1) 0.04 *** 0.09 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.05 ***
 3.30  4.45  2.90  3.30  3.72  
Output gap (-1) 0.09  0.10  0.09  0.09  0.08  
 1.42  1.45  1.41  1.42  1.21  
EMU dummy 0.81 *** 0.88 *** 0.81 *** 0.80 *** 0.68 ***
 3.97  4.31  3.97  3.88  3.07  
SGP dummy 0.73 *** 0.90 *** 0.73 *** 0.67 ** 0.64 ** 
 2.69  3.16  2.64  2.37  2.30  
Enlargement dummy 0.17  -0.20  0.17  0.19  0.17  
 0.39  -0.43  0.38  0.44  0.39  
Election dummy -0.51 ** -0.52 ** -0.51 ** -0.52 ** -0.50 ** 
 -2.41  -2.43  -2.41  -2.42  -2.33  
General government fiscal rule (-1) 0.31 ** 0.26 * 0.31 ** 0.30 * 0.34 ** 
  2.02  1.75   1.98    1.95   2.20   
Subnational expenditure share (-1) -0.10 ** -  -  -  -  
 -2.29          
Subn. exp. share (-1) x Debt (-1) -  0.00 *** -  -  -  
   -2.99        
Subn. exp. share (-1) x D60  (-1) -  -  -0.10 ** -  -  
    -2.23      
Subn. exp. share (-1) x (1 - D60)  (-1) -  -  -0.10 ** -  -  
     -2.28      
Subn. exp. share (-1) x D70  (-1) -  -  -  -0.10 ** -  
      -2.39    
Subn. exp. share (-1) x (1 - D70)  (-1) -  -  -  -0.09 ** -  
      -2.06    
Subn. exp. share (-1) x D80  (-1) -  -  -  -  -0.13 *** 
        -3.03  
Subn. exp. share (-1) x (1 - D80)  (-1) -  -  -  -  -0.09 ** 
        -2.00  
Observations 291   291   291   291   291   
adj R2 0.76   0.76   0.76   0.76   0.76   
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. 
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 countrie
between 1994 and 1998, 0 otherwise. SGP dummy, 1 after 1997 for the countries that are (adhered) in (to) the EU, 0
otherwise. Enlargement dummy, 1 for the New Member States after entering the EU, 0 otherwise. 
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Table B5 – Fiscal reaction function for the primary balance (fixed-effects, 1990-2005),
the relevance of government tax decentralisation 
  1   2   3   4   5   
Primary balance (-1) 0.51 *** 0.50 *** 0.51 *** 0.50 *** 0.51 ***
 7.01  6.75  6.96  6.83  6.99  
Debt (-1) 0.05 *** 0.06 *** 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.05 ***
 4.03  4.58  3.79  4.16  4.22  
Output gap (-1) 0.10  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.09  
 1.42  1.38  1.41  1.45  1.30  
EMU dummy 0.84 *** 0.90 *** 0.85 *** 0.81 *** 0.78 ***
 4.07  4.32  4.08  4.15  3.71  
SGP dummy 0.62 ** 0.81 * 0.63 ** 0.60 ** 0.62 ** 
 2.40  2.84  2.32  2.35  2.41  
Enlargement dummy 0.07  -0.12  0.05  0.04  -0.03  
 0.45  -0.27  0.11  0.09  -0.07  
Election dummy -0.49 ** -0.49 ** -0.49 ** -0.47 ** -0.50 ** 
 -2.26  -2.31  -2.27  -2.18  -2.32  
General government fiscal rule (-1) 0.29 * 0.25  0.29 * 0.29 * 0.27 * 
  1.93  1.63   1.84   1.78   1.76   
Subnational tax share (-1) -0.03   -  -  -  -  
 -1.17         
Subn. tax share (-1) x Debt (-1) -  0.00 ** -  -  -  
   -2.11       
Subn. tax share (-1) x D60  (-1) -  -  -0.03  -  -  
    -1.06      
Subn. tax share (-1) x (1 - D60)  (-1) -  -  -0.03  -  -  
     -1.18      
Subn. tax share (-1) x D70  (-1) -  -  -  -0.04 * -  
      -1.68    
Subn. tax share (-1) x (1 - D70)  (-1) -  -  -  -0.02  -  
     -0.94    
Subn. tax share (-1) x D80  (-1) -  -  -  -  -0.07 ** 
       -2.15  
Subn. tax share (-1) x (1 - D80)  (-1) -  -  -  -  -0.01  
       0.75  
Observations 291   291   291   291   291   
adj R2 0.75   0.75   0.75   0.75   0.76   
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. 
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 countrie
between 1994 and 1998, 0 otherwise. SGP dummy, 1 after 1997 for the countries that are (adhered) in (to) the EU, 0
otherwise. Enlargement dummy, 1 for the New Member States after entering the EU, 0 otherwise. 
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Table B6 – Fiscal reaction function for the primary spending 
(fixed-effects, 1990-2005) 
  1   2   3   4   
Primary expenditure (-1) 0.67*** 0.66  *** 0.68 *** 0.68 *** 
 8.23  8.31  8.54  8.44  
Debt (-1) -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
 -0.89  -0.60  -0.87  -0.96  
Output gap (-1) 0.05  0.06  0.06  0.06  
 0.72  0.80  0.82  0.76  
EMU dummy -0.64*** -0.71 *** -0.67 *** -0.63 *** 
 -2.63  -2.98  -2.77  -2.58  
SGP dummy -0.38  -0.41 * -0.54 ** -0.57 ** 
 -1.48  -1.75  -2.25  -2.13  
Enlargement dummy 0.15  0.23  0.28  0.31  
 0.32  0.48  0.60  0.66  
Election dummy 0.41  0.38  0.42 * 0.43 * 
 1.65  1.56  1.68  1.73  
General government fiscal rule (-1) -0.35* -  -  -  
 -2.01       
Central government fiscal rule (-1) -  -0.28  -  -  
   -1.55      
Sub-national government fiscal rule (-1) -  -0.55  -  -  
   -1.45      
Budget balance fiscal rule (-1) -  -  -0.23  -  
     -1.32    
Expenditure rule (-1) -  -  -  -0.18  
            -1.22   
Observations 308   308   308   308   
adj R2 0.92   0.92   0.92   0.92   
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. 
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 countries 
between 1994 and 1998, 0 otherwise. SGP dummy, 1 after 1997 for the countries that are (adhered) in (to) the EU, 0 
otherwise. Enlargement dummy, 1 for the New Member States after entering the EU, 0 otherwise. 
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Primary balance (-1) 0.47*** -  -  
 6.61   
Cyclically adjusted primary balance (-1) -  0.47*** -  
   7.23  
Primary expenditure (-1) -  -  0.67*** 
    8.27 
Output gap (-1) 0.08 -  0.06 
 1.24  0.75 
EMU dummy 0.70*** 0.45** -0.64*** 
 3.21 2.07 -2.62 
SGP dummy 0.46* -0.07 -0.36 
 1.78 -0.31 -1.43 
Enlargement dummy 0.36 0.81* 0.13 
 0.81 1.83 0.27 
General government fiscal rule (-1) 0.38** 0.42*** -0.36** 
  2.44 2.93 -2.07 
Debt (-1) [ ] 0.05*** 0.048*** -0.01 
 4.25 4.63 -0.98 
Election dummy x Debt (-1) [ ] -0.0068** -0.007** 0.006** 
 -2.38 -2.53 2.00 
Observations 308 308 308 
adj R2 0.71 0.74 0.92 
 Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. 
 *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. EMU dummy, 1 for EU15 
countries between 1994 and 1998, 0 otherwise. SGP dummy, 1 after 1997 for the countries that are 
(adhered) in (to) the EU, 0 otherwise. Enlargement dummy, 1 for the New Member States after entering the 
EU, 0 otherwise. 
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